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Are German stock values vulnerable to exchange rate movements? Classical financial 
theory implies that stock market values of firms should be affected by foreign exchange 
rate risk (Dufey 1972, Shapiro 1974). However, according to standard international port-
folio choice models, optimally allocated world market portfolios hedge against exchange 
rate risk (Solnik 1974, Adler and Dumas 1983). To the extent that foreign exchange risk 
represents unsystematic risk, it can be diversified away, provided that investors and 
owners of equities have the same quality of information about the firm as management 
– a condition not likely to prevail in practice (Dufey and Giddy, 2003). Tests of predic-
tions derived from such theoretical considerations have been facilitated by the work of 
Adler and Dumas (1980, 1984), who have shown that exchange rate exposure can be 
measured as the sensitivity of stock returns to exchange rate movements within the 
simple framework of linear regression models.  
Econometric studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency expo-
sure (see Jorion 1990 and 1991, Bodnar and Gentry 1993, He and Ng 1998, Domin-
guez and Tesar 2001 a,b,c, Koutmos and Martin 2003, inter alia). If found in the data, 
exchange rate exposure is expected to be related to international trade. However, 
based on data from eight countries, Dominguez and Tesar (2001 b,c), for instance, con-
clude that they do not find a strong connection between trade and exposure. Recent 
studies discuss possible reasons for this lack of significance, as there are, for instance, 
time-varying risks (De Santis and Gerard 1998, Tai 2000), hedging activities (Allayannis 
and Ofek 2001, Crabb 2002), neglected issues of competitiveness within industrial sec-
tors (Marston 2001), potential nonlinearities (Bartram 2004) or asymmetric exposure 
(Koutmos and Martin 2003). 
This study takes a fresh look at the subject using German data and new theoretical ar-
guments. Due to its high international dependency, Germany is very well suited for test-
ing the existence of exchange rate exposure. Our approach extends the literature in 
several ways. The usual way of measuring “residual” exchange rate exposure is based 
on a CAPM specification augmented by exchange rate risk. However, as many previous 
attempts at estimating exchange exposure based on augmented CAPM have led to in-
significant results, one drawback of this specification seems to be that exchange rates 
do have an indirect effect on individual stocks through market returns such that the re- 
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sidual impact of exchange rates on stock returns in augmented CAPM specifications is 
partly covered by market returns. We thus suggest avoiding problems that arise due to 
the collinearity between market returns and exchange rates by employing orthogonal-
ized market returns, as they represent the component of market returns that is uncorre-
lated with exchange rates. On the other hand, significance of exposure might be sup-
pressed and parameter estimates may be misleading due to the omission of other rele-
vant macroeconomic risks such as inflation and interest rate fluctuations. We therefore 
check robustness of results by both following the strategy of orthogonalizing the aug-
mented CAPM specification as well as employing multifactor-modelling in the spirit of 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) instead of augmented CAPM. The latter is motivated by 
macroeconomic shocks such as divergent monetary and fiscal policies, as well as asyn-
chronous output movements which all might drive stock returns and exchange rates in 
multidimensional ways such that any prediction of the prevailing impact of exchange 
rates on stock returns might be regime-dependent (see Gavin, 1989). Following further 
along these lines, we take account of time-dependency risks by running moving-window 
regressions. In order to exploit the longitudinal information within the data of German 
DAX corporations used, we propose to apply rolling-panel estimation techniques.   
The role of second or higher moments caused by exchange rate adjustment costs, al-
though at the heart of uncertainty caused by exchange rate fluctuations, has received 
surprisingly little attention in the literature (remarkable exceptions being Miller and 
Reuter 1998, Andren 2001, Priestley and Odegaard, 2002, and Bartram 2004). Theo-
retical analysis reveals that profits and firm values are a convex function of the ex-
change rate (see Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle 1992, and DeGrauwe 1994, among 
others). Several recent research articles have been motivated by the fact that a high 
percentage of firms use hedging strategies (see Bodnar and Gebhard 1998, and Bar-
tram et al., 2003, for surveys) to circumvent such costs of adjustment, and focus on 
hedging and reduced risk stemming from the use of forward contracts, options or other 
hedging strategies. The great bulk of research, however, neglects that there might be 
substantial costs of hedging, and that hedging costs depend on the exchange rate itself 
(see Dufey and Giddy, 2003, for strategies of managing corporate foreign exchange risk 
and related costs). The price of an option, for instance, increases convexly with the ex-
pectation for a currency’s volatility because of inherent leverage effects: the more vola-
tile, the higher the price. Our paper takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by  
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modelling exposure in dependence of exchange rate variation. Grounded on theoretical 
arguments (see Franke 1991, for instance) and empirical evidence (see Engel and 
Hamilton, 1990, and succeeding research), both stressing the importance of mean-
reverting exchange rates, we analyse the impact of substantial deviations from ex-
pected long-run benchmarks in terms of theoretical considerations and empirical inves-
tigations.  
Exchange rate exposure is estimated and predicted hypotheses are tested using per-
formance indices from the German DAX corporations of the time 1977 to 1995, which 
was a period without adjustment processes following the breakdown of the Bretton 
Wood system in 1973 (Bartov et al. 1996), and without anticipatory distortions in the 
face of the forthcoming introduction of the euro in 1999.   
Our intention is to derive conclusions with respect to aggregate exchange rate exposure 
of the German economy. We thus focus on a macroeconomic (macrofinancial) point of 
view, although conclusions are drawn on returns observed for individual stock compa-
nies. Econometric results show a rather unstable (regime-dependent) exposure of Ger-
man stock market companies. In general (on average), German exposure is well de-
scribed through the role of a net exporter, who benefits from the depreciation of domes-
tic currency. Thus, as predicted by theoretical reasoning, estimations of time-varying 
exposure based on DM/US-dollar risks have a positive sign with the exception of the 
first half of the 1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency and a strong US dol-
lar changed the situation. Theoretical modelling also suggests that adjustment costs 
play a role. We find that the larger the distance of current exchange rates from their 
long-mean is, the lower company values are. Results are in accordance with long-run 
mean reversion and confirm the negative effect of exchange rate adjustment costs on 
exchange rate exposure. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present previous research. Section 
3 describes the econometric modelling of exchange rate exposure, and in Section 4 we 
introduce the data sets employed. Section 5 presents a theoretical framework for the 
explanatory determinants of exposure, and informs about estimation results. Section 6 




2. Previous Research 
Most studies have been of limited success in identifying foreign currency exposure. 
Jorion (1990) analysed the exposure to exchange rates of 287 U.S. multinationals and 
found that only 15 of them are significantly affected by exchange rates. Bodnar and 
Gentry (1993), who provided evidence based on industry data for Canada, Japan and 
the U.S, reported that between 20 and 35 percent of industries have statistically signifi-
cant exchange rate exposures. He and Ng (1998) investigated the exchange rate expo-
sure of Japanese corporations and found that for the period 1979 to December 1993, 
only 25 percent of the 171 Japanese multinationals have significant exposure. Domin-
guez and Tesar (2001) examine the extent of firm and industry-level exposure in a 
sample of industrialized and developing countries for the period 1980-1999. In the 
pooled eight-country sample, they found that 23 percent of firms and 40 percent of in-
dustries are exposed to at least one of their indicators of exchange rate exposure (US 
dollar, trade-weighted exchange rate, currency of the country’s major trading partner). 
Koutmos and Martin (2003) analysed exchange rate exposure in nine aggregate sectors 
of major economies (Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), and 
confirmed existence of exposure in approximately 40 percent of the country-sector 
models.  
Many recent empirical studies focus their research on factors that determine the extent 
of exposure. An evident question is whether exchange rate exposure is influenced 
through the channel of international trade. Previous research in this area was pioneered 
by Jorion (1990), who showed that a firm’s exchange rate exposure is positively related 
to the ratio of foreign sales to total sales. This result was extended and confirmed by 
recent work of He and Ng (1978), Dominguez and Tesar (2001), and Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001), inter alia. He and Ng (1998) showed that Japanese multinationals with 
higher exposure levels are related to higher export shares. However, looking at interna-
tional evidence, Dominguez and Tesar (2001b,c) concluded that they did not find a 
strong connection between trade and exposure, although there seems to be some evi-
dence that a higher level of foreign sales corresponds to higher exposure for Germany 
(Dominguez and Tesar, 2001c, Table 10).  Marston (2001) and Bodnar et al. (2002) 
have drawn attention to the fact that even a local firm which neither exports nor imports 
can be exposed to changes in exchange rates, for instance if it competes with foreign 
firms in the domestic market. Thus, as is known from the related literature on exchange- 
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rate pass-through, an important determinant is the competitive structure of the industry 
in which a firm operates. Some studies have shown that the use of foreign currency de-
rivatives (FCDs), i.e. a short-term (less than one year) hedging strategy, is related to 
exchange rate exposure. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found that the use of FCDs is 
negatively related to the absolute value of foreign currency exposure. By controlling for 
hedging activity, Crabb (2002) provided evidence that previous studies often found in-
significant effects because hedging mitigated currency risks. Exchange rate exposure 
seems to be higher when companies operate within a system of liberalized exchange 
rates. Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996) consider the switch from fixed to floating ex-
change rates following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1973 and found 
increasing risks thereafter, whereas Bartram and Karolyi (2003) showed that the intro-
duction of the euro in 1999 was accompanied by significant reductions in market risk 
exposures in and outside of Europe.   
Due to its high share of sales going to exports and its high share of imported goods, 
Germany is very well suited for testing exchange rate exposure. Indeed, Bartram 
(2004), who argued that exchange rate exposure may be partly nonlinear, identified 
both linear and nonlinear exposure components using data of 447 German corpora-
tions. However, at the sector level, Koutmos and Martin (2003) found significant ex-
change rate exposure for only one out of nine sectors in Germany. Based on returns of 
12 sector indexes, Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998) detected significant (positive) expo-
sure for chemicals, motor cars and machinery, steel production, and holdings, suggest-
ing that exposure in Germany is mainly driven by exporting activities
1. Glaum et. al 
(2000) showed that total exchange rate exposure is unstable over time. Entorf (2000) 
estimated a time-varying measure of overall German currency risk and showed that it 
significantly depends both on German exports and imports. Bartram (1999), Dominguez 
and Tesar (2001b) and Brunner (2003) confirmed the positive impact of foreign sales on 
exposure using firm level data. Brunner (2003) also tested statistical evidence of several 
other factors and found that particularly firm size and financial leverage ratios both lead 
to higher exchange rate exposure of German companies. 
                                            
1 Entorf and Kabbalakes (1998) estimated the extent of “total” exchange rate exposure by regressing 
foreign exchange rates on stock returns without controlling for general market risks, whereas Koutmos 
and Martin (2003) estimated the “residual” effect by including the overall market factor.  
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3. Econometric specification: Orthogonalization issues, APT versus 
augmented CAPM, and time-varying measurement 
As in most studies measuring exchange rate exposure, we follow Adler and Dumas 
(1984) who showed that the extent of corporate exposure boils down to the slope pa-
rameter 
t
i δ  of a regression  
(1)      
tt t
iii i rd α δε = ++     
where  i r  is the stock market return of company i, i = 1,2,…N, and d  is the return of the 
exchange rate, i.e. the log-difference of exchange rate levels. The latter are measured 
in terms of the price of the foreign currency in units of the home currency. Most previous 
econometric studies further control for overall market risk  m r  leading to a CAPM specifi-
cation augmented by exchange rate movements, 
( 2 )        
cc c c
it i i t i mt it rd r α δβε = ++ + , 
based on time series observations. The “conditional” or “residual” effect (as it was called 
by Bodnar and Wong, 2003), i.e. the exposure that is different from general market ex-
posure, measured by 
c
i δ  in equation (2), is then interpreted as “residual” exchange rate 
exposure, whereas the slope parameter 
t
i δ in equation (1) would imply some measure 
of “total” exposure (Bodnar and Wong, 2003) that might be disturbed by some spurious 
effects arising when common market factors drive both exchange rates and (all) stock 
returns simultaneously (due to unanticipated monetary shocks, for instance). 
Sensitivity of individual firm values to overall market risk (i.e. the “beta” of a firm in the 
context of non-augmented CAPM modelling) is covered by
c
i β . A problem with specifica-
tion (2) is that overall market exposure, m r , which in empirical studies is represented by 
broad market indices such as the DAX, includes several driving factors, of which ex-
change rate risk may be particularly important. Thus, insignificance of previous results 
might arise from the fact that currency risks were already included in overall risk and 
priced in market risk factors, leading to the misleading statistical result that collinearity 
between market portfolios and exchange rates prevents significant results. To circum-
vent a problem such as this, we apply a strategy well known from testing Arbitrage Pric-
ing Theory (APT). McElroy and Burmeister (1988) introduced the use of the so-called  
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“residual market factor” which implies orthogonalization of overall market risk and other 
risk factors which only consist of exchange rates in the present case of augmented 
CAPM. Thus, we first estimate an auxiliary regression to capture that particular fraction 
of aggregate market risk which was induced by exchange rate fluctuations: 
(3)         mt t mt rd r αδ = ++  
The residual of the regression, mt r , represents the residual market factor, i.e. the overall 
market risk corrected for the influence of exchange rates. Inserting  mt r  from equation (3) 
into equation (2) gives  
(4)        
oo o o
it i i t i mt it rd r α δβε = ++ + , 
where 
        
occ
iii α αβ α =+ ,  
occ
iii δ δβ δ =+ , 
oc
ii β β = , and 
oc
it it ε ε = . 
Thus, 
o
i δ summarizes direct and indirect components of exchange rate exposure, 
whereas the market beta coefficient 
o
i β on  mt r remains the same as
c
i β  on  mt r  in equa-
tion (2). Residuals, too, coincide implying the same R-squared in empirical estimations 
of both models.  
One may argue that it is precisely the incremental effect of exchange rate movements 
not covered by market risk, i.e. of 
c
i δ  in equation (2), which is of particular interest here, 
because it represents the firm-specific component of conditional exchange rate expo-
sure. However, under the aspect that a firm should be interested in hedging the risk of 
total potential value changes resulting from any exchange rate movements, it is of no 
importance whether these changes affect the common risk of all firms or the risk of the 
individual firm only.  
On the one hand this argument applies because we are, by way of aggregating individ-
ual data, primarily interested in exchange exposure faced by the German economy as a 
whole, not in marginal exposure of particular firms. From this point of view, exposing the  
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relevant currency risk by way of orthogonalization seems to be an adequate strategy 
which has been followed by some authors before.
2 On the other hand, both total expo-
sure estimates and augmented CAPM specification of exposure estimation regression 
overlook the fact that further macroeconomic factors besides exchange rates can influ-
ence individual returns. For instance, a depreciation might be related to some expan-
sionary monetary policy that simultaneously could have a positive impact on economic 
activity of domestic firms (Dornbusch, 1976). From the more general viewpoint of finan-
cial and macroeconomic theory, Gavin (1989) provided a framework that shows how 
exchange rates and stock returns interact, and how they react to changes in interest 
rates, output, and, in particular, to anticipated and unanticipated changes of monetary 
and fiscal policy (see also Blanchard, 1981, for a related work).
3 From the viewpoint of 
financial economics, a well known strategy for using controls for such disturbing macro-
economic influences is the application of “Arbitrage Pricing Theory” (APT), pioneered by 
Ross (1976), and already introduced by Jorion (1991) to the literature on exchange ex-
                                            
2 However, there seems to be some confusion as to what kind of orthogonalization should be used in 
econometric tests of the Adler-Dumas framework. Most applications we are aware of proceed in the man-
ner described above (Doukas et al. 1999, Allayannis and Ofek, 2001, Griffin and Stulz, 2001, Priestley 
and Odegaard, 2002, Bris et al. 2004, Jayasinghe and Premaratne (2004), among others), whereas 
Jorion (1991) proposed orthogonalization of exchange rates, i.e. he employed the reverse regression by 
regressing exchange rates on market portfolios. The residual from this regression, i.e. orthogonalized 
exchange rates, were included in the exposure regression in addition to total market risk. This approach 
is counterintuitive and does not coincide with the usual way of orthogonalization known from multi-factor 
APT modelling. It is also misleading as it does not solve the problem of “hidden” exposure covered and 
priced in overall market risk. The estimated parameter on orthogonalized exchange rates, i.e. estimated 
exposure, is even identical to estimated exposure of unorthogonalized exchange rates of equation (2) in 
reversed regressions, whereas the coefficient of market risk would change its value (see (4) and substi-
tute variables accordingly). Motivated by related work of Choi and Prasad (1995), Glaum et al. (2000) 
followed the path described in Jorion (1991). Not surprisingly, they did not find any significant “residual” 
exposure for German data. From this, they erroneously draw the conclusion that estimating “total” ex-
change rate exposure (in the sense of equation (1)) would be a better way of proceeding.  
3 It should be noted, however, that there are good reasons for neglecting potential problems of endogene-
ity in our specification, since left-hand side variables, i.e. corporate returns, are observed at the individual 
level, whereas explanatory variables such as exchange rate fluctuations or trade are given at the aggre-




4 Thus, to test robustness of econometric results, performed estimation strategy 
includes the application of the multi-factor equation of the APT model
5, according to 
which the variation of stock returns is explained by a K-factor model of the form 
K rB f µ ε =+ + , where  r  is  the vector of returns in N stock prices, and  K f  is a vector 
of K (unanticipated) factors, of which only the (residual) market factor and exchange-
rate fluctuations were used in previous augmented CAPM specifications of the exposure 
regressions. B is a NxK matrix of factor sensitivities to the K factors.  
There is no general rule for selecting relevant macroeconomic risk factors. According to 
the “discounted cash flow model”, which assumes that prices of assets are determined 
through their expected discounted dividend payments, factors have to be selected that 
are potentially responsible for the determination of these payments. Inspired by factors 
proposed by Chen et al. (1986), who pioneered the empirical approach of estimating the 
APT, we include a survey indicator of the German business climate, the inflation rate, 
the term structure, a (residual) market factor, and, in particular, the US dollar, represent-
ing the most important source of German exchange rate risk.  
Since only unexpected components of macroeconomic time series can influence asset 
returns in efficient capital markets, we calculate unexpected variation of all variables 
applying ARMA- and ARIMA-filtering techniques. In order to capture the (residual) mar-
ket risk that is not explained by other systematic risk factors, we follow the procedure 
suggested by McElroy and Burmeister (1988) described above. Therefore we include 
the residual market factor that now becomes the residual of an OLS-regression of the 
market return on the unexpected components of all involved macroeconomic variables, 
                                            
4 The reason why this idea was widely neglected in later work might be that he used orthogonalized ex-
change rates (instead of orthogonalized market factor) such that significance was low and suffered from 
multicollinearity. 
5 We do not present estimations of a full APT model in this paper, because our focus is on time-variant 
rolling window regressions based on panel information. A complete model consists of the joint determina-
tion of factor sensitivities within the multi-factor model and of risk premia, which reveal whether investors 
have to be compensated by a higher expected return because the exchange rate risk or other risks are 
not diversifiable. Nonlinear seemingly unrelated regressions of the complete model have been performed 
in Jamin (1999) and Entorf and Jamin (2000).  
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including exchange rate risk. Thus, the specification of an APT exposure regression can 
be considered as an extended version of equation (4):   
(5)         ´
aa a a ua
it i i t i mt i t it rd r f α δβ ϕ ε = ++ + + , 
where f represents a vector of macroeconomic variables, and the superscript u denotes 
unexpected components.  
Not surprisingly, testing ARIMA models for the DM/dollar return as well as for market 
risk factors has led to the conclusion that their (short-term) time series behaviour is well 
described by random walks (results not reported). Thus, we treat both returns of the 
DM/dollar rate as well as of the market factors as unexpected components (note miss-
ing superscripts ‘u’ for dollar and market returns in equation (5)). Due to this specifica-
tion and the orthogonalization of the residual market factor and macroeconomic factors, 
CAPM in equation (4) boils down to be a simple parametric restriction of the APT ver-
sion estimated in equation (5). 
Some problems with the interpretation and comparisons of chosen specifications may 
occur. First, note that due to the orthogonalization procedure, residual market returns 
mt r  and dollar returns  t d  are uncorrelated such that OLS estimates of exposure in equa-
tion (4) would be identical to total exposure estimated from equation (1) as long as no 
further restrictions are imposed
6, whereas standard errors are adjusted due to the better 
fit of the model in equation (4). Thus, the primary interest of the imposed orthogonaliza-
tion procedure is to uncover potentially neglected significance of exchange rate expo-
sure, not the level of exposure. Of course, estimated exposure itself is also of high in-
terest for researchers and practitioners. Thus, when in equation (5) macro variables are 
added, standard errors of exposure might be further adjusted, but there may also exist a 
correlation between these variables and the exchange rate such that they may ‘absorb’ 
explanatory power from the exchange rate leading to a smaller estimate of exposure.
7  
                                            
6 Note, however, that SUR (seemingly unrelated regressions, see below) does not coincide with OLS 
estimation of total exposure (see equation (1)) and residual exposure (see equation (4)) when company-
specific constants are included.  
7 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing out this interpretation problem. At first glance, 
cleaning out all macro variables similar to the market return by individually adjusting them for their interac-
tion with the exchange rate (i.e. by regressing their returns one by one on exchange rate returns) seems  
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It is thus important to check sensitivity of results dependent on the presence or absence 
of further macro risks. In any event, compared to orthogonalized CAPM, inclusion of 
other macro variables represents a conservative test for the presence of any exchange 
rate exposure.
8  
Our econometric modelling extends previous approaches by controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity of company firm values using fixed company effects
9 which might arise 
due to particular features not observable in the data (management, reputation, etc.). 
With individual DAX companies available, we stack individual time series and run each 
of presented specifications (1), (2), (4) and (5) as systems of seemingly unrelated re-
gressions (SUR). SUR considers correlations of disturbances across companies and 
leads to GLS estimation of the whole system. Stacking companies allows testing sev-
eral hypotheses as well as estimation of aggregate exposure: 1)  
aa
i α α =  for every 
company i (test for unobserved heterogeneity)) , 2) 
aa
i δ δ =  for every i;  non-rejection 
and imposing the restriction gives an estimate of aggregate stock market exposure, 3) 
aa
i β β =  for every i; if the restriction 
aa
i β β =  holds, then the universe of all German 
DAX companies would share a common overall market risk, and 4) if  0
a
i ϕ =  for every i,  
then APT could be restricted to augmented CAPM.  
                                                                                                                                             
to be a promising alternative strategy. Note, however, as this procedure would lead to exchange rates 
being orthogonal to all other variables in the extended APT-like regression, estimated exposure would be 
identical to total exposure from equation (1), i.e. there would be no additional insight with respect to the 
measurement of exposure. Furthermore, as this procedure would neglect orthonalization of macro vari-
ables and the market factor, now the market factor may absorb the impact of macro variables, i.e. macro 
variables would be correlated with the market factor. In a (non-reported) regression following the alterna-
tive in question, i.e. using individually adjusted macro factors, it turns out that all of them keep insignifi-
cant (whereas Table 2, column (4), see below, reveals their significance when the usual orthogonalization 
procedure is followed).  
 
8 In the German example, a comparison of estimates in Table 1 and Table 2 (based on total sample pe-
riod, see below) reveals that the difference is rather small: Inclusion of macro risks has reduced exchange 
rate exposure from about 0.17 to 0.14.   
9 We do not test for random effects because our primary goal is to achieve consistent results of the expo-
sure parameters needed in the second stage of the estimation procedure (to be discussed below).   
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Even after controlling for macroeconomic risks, unobservable macroeconomic and fi-
nancial changes may result in unstable currency exposure. Moreover, exposure reflects 
expectations of investors which do not depend on the whole history of financial markets, 
but rather on limited information sets. Thus, estimations should be time-varying, and 
they should give much more weight on recent observations. Accordingly, we estimate 
equation (5) using moving window regressions, with each additional rolling sample giv-




Most applications of exchange rate exposure models are based on two-stage proce-
dures, pioneered by the work of Jorion (1990). In the standard first stage, by running N 
time series regressions, the stock returns of a sample of N companies are regressed on 
the exchange rate within an augmented CAPM discussed above (see equation (2)). 
Second-stage specifications then consist of a cross-sectional regression of exchange 
rate exposure 
c
i δ  on averaged indicators of foreign involvement, or other determinants 
of exposure discussed above. We extend this procedure by performing moving APT 
multifactor models, thereby employing panel information of company returns. Disposing 
of resulting time-varying exposures 
a
it δ  or 
o
it δ  (instead of cross-sectional
c
i δ , for in-
stance) in second-stage regressions allows us to focus on panel data and time series 
instead of cross sections to analyse the (macro-) economic determinants of exchange 
rate exposure. 
 
4. Data  
Our sample of stocks includes 28 leading German corporations comprising the DAX 
(the leading index of the Frankfurt stock exchange) on the 31
st of March 1995.
11 They 
represent about 70 % of total turnover in German stocks during the sample period.
12 
Monthly returns for the period from January 1977 through March 1995 are adjusted for 
dividends, capital increases and splits according to adjustment factors obtained from 
                                            
10 As only unanticipated realizations enter the APT multifactor model, unexpected components of all ex-
planatory variables are calculated using residuals from ARIMA models for each rolling sample.   
11 In order to take advantage of a balanced panel, VIAG and Henkel had to be excluded as their returns 
were not available for the whole estimation period. 
12 See Sauer, A. (1994), p. 102.  
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KKMDB, i.e the “Karlsruhe Data Base for Financial Time Series” (“Karlsruher Kapital-
marktdatenbank”).
13 
Macroeconomic risks are based on the following variables:  
• Business  climate:  Monthly change rate of the “ifo business climate” (“ifo-
Geschaeftsklimaindex”), an acknowledged German leading business cycle indicator 
published by CESifo (Munich). 
•  Inflation: Monthly rate of change in the German consumer price index (“Lebenshal-
tungskostenindex”) calculated by the German Federal Statistical Office (Statistisches 
Bundesamt). 
•  Term structure: Difference between the 10-year rate on German government bonds 
and the 1-month money market rate, both calculated by Deutsche Bundesbank 
(Frankfurt). 
•  Exchange rate: We use closing rates of the “Deutsche Mark (DM)/ US dollar” ex-
change rate at the Frankfurt foreign exchange market. As our objective is to examine 
the particular importance of the US dollar for German stock companies, we refrain 
from using trade-weighted averages of different currencies, as was proposed by 
Jorion (1990, 1991), and applied by Bodnar and Gentry (1993) and others.
14  
                                            
13 KKMDB was supported by the German National Science Foundation (DFG, Deutsche Forschungsge-
meinschaft) to provide a file of German stock prices and performance indices for scientific use. For further 
information see http://finance.wiwi.uni-karlsruhe.de/Forschung/kkmdb.html.  
14 The use of trade-weighted indices was proposed by Jorion (1990, 1991) who analysed US exposure. In 
the US, however, there is no single currency which is as important as the US dollar for German or Euro-
pean economies. In Germany, the US dollar clearly is the centre of investors’ attention, as can be seen 
from perpetual and recurrent comments in newspapers, “Up or down, euro leaves exporters complaining” 
(International Herald Tribune, May 9, 2003), “Anleger verkaufen Exportwerte. Aufwertung von Yen und 
Euro trüben Gewinnaussichten japanischer und europäischer Firmen”  (“Investors sell shares of export-
oriented companies. Appreciation of yen and euro obscure expected profit of Japanese and European 
firms”  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 23, 2003). From this quotations, note the relevance of 
US dollars as ”euro“ always refers to US-dollar/euro. Moreover, note the high relevance of the DM/dollar 
rate for the euro, as it was the key currency in Europe, and its share amounted to 33.07 percent (second 
largest share: French Franc, 20.28 percent) of the basket of currencies constituting the ecu, i.e. the “syn-
thetic” currency preceding the euro.   
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The overall German market risk is based on the DAFOX (“Deutscher Aktien-
Forschungs-Index”), which is a Laspeyres performance index including all 30 DAX cor-
porations as a subset (see Göppl and Schütz, 1993, for details). It was generated for 
scientific research purposes in order to dispose of a broader index of overall German 
stock market portfolio than the one provided by the DAX, which only consists of German 
blue chips (source: KKMDB).   
Indicators of foreign involvement are available as shares of exported and imported 
goods and services in German GDP (West Germany, source: Statistisches Bundesamt). 
This allows us to consider the burden of (imported) input costs as well, an issue that is 
often neglected in empirical studies which mainly limit their focus to foreign sales. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. Direction and Magnitude of Exposure 
We compare exposure estimates of orthogonalized augmented CAPM and APT-based 
models for different periods of time in Tables 1 to 3. Our sample consists of monthly 
returns of 28 DAX companies for the time period January 1977 to March 1995, leading 
to 6132 observations. The sample period lies well beyond the beginning of floating ex-
change rates in 1973 and well ahead the introduction of the euro in 1999. This selection 
avoids potentially misleading results due to adjustment problems after the breakdown of 
the Bretton Woods system described by Bartov, Bodnar and Kaul (1996), or because of 
anticipating investment decisions in the face of a forthcoming introduction of the euro 
(see Bartram and Karolyi, 2003).   
In Table 1, column (1), estimates of the augmented CAPM reveal that company-specific 
effects turn out to be insignificant. Evidently, observed heterogeneity already covered by 
company-specific exposure,
o
i δ , and company-specific influences from market fac-
tors,
o
i β , render control for unobserved heterogeneity meaningless. All company esti-
mates of exchange rate exposure have a positive sign, and 12 of them are significant. 
As regards market betas, individual estimates of overall market influences range be-
tween 0.79 (RWE, a former energy utility) and 1.32 (Daimler, car production).  
In Table 1, column (2), we test for common exposure, identical to all DAX companies. 
This hypothesis is not rejected. Exposure is highly significant and estimated to be 0.172.  
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Thus, for the period 1977 to 1995, an increase of the DM/US dollar-exchange rate by 10 
percent (i.e. a depreciation of domestic, i.e. German, currency) on average increased 
stock market values of German companies by 1.7 percent.  
Table 1, column (3), additionally restricts individual coefficients of overall market portfo-
lio risk to be identical for all companies. The aggregate estimate is 1.072, indicating 
overall offensive behaviour of German DAX companies in the long run. However, testing 
the restriction shows that the hypothesis of a common parameter, i.e.
oo
i β β = , has to be 
rejected (see footnote of Table 1 for details of hypothesis testing). The estimate of ex-
change rate exposure,
o δ , remains almost unchanged (0.168 instead of 0.172). 
Finally, specification (2) is replicated using the overall market factor  m r instead of the 
residual market factor m r  (Table 1, last column). Indeed, for reasons discussed in Sec-
tion 3, using this specification leads to insignificance of exchange rate exposure
c
i δ . 
Thus, we can conclude that exchange rate exposure is an important determinant of 
German stock values, but that it would not show up in standard (not orthogonalized) 
residual exposure models based on overall market risk. 
General market risk presumably has more than one dimension. Table 2 controls for fur-
ther macroeconomic factors within the framework of an APT-based multifactor model. 
Table 2, column (1), presents unrestricted
15 estimates. Results do not differ much from 
corresponding column (1) of Table 1: Now 26 out of 28 company exposures have a 
positive sign (and 8 of them are significant instead of 12 in Table 1), and the range of 
market betas is almost the same as before (ranging between RWE’s 0.79 and Daimler’s 
1.34).
16 Inspecting column (2) shows that the standard error of the aggregate exchange 
exposure coefficient 
a δ remains the same as in Table 1 (0.014). The aggregate esti-
mate of exchange rate exposure is somewhat smaller 0.139 (instead of 0.172 in Table 
1), indicating that indeed some of the explanatory power of exchange rates is absorbed 
from added macro variables, as pointed out in Section 3.
17 However, exchange rate ex-
                                            
15 As before, tests show insignificance of company-specific fixed effects. 
16 Company-specific exposures and sensitivities to overall market factors are presented in Tables C and 
D of the Appendix.  
17 In a regression of dollar returns on unanticipated macro variables (results not reported elsewhere in the 
paper) it is found that unanticipated inflation and changes in the term structure significantly contribute to  
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posure remains highly significant such that any correlation with macro variables is of 
second order of importance when compared to the strong change of statistical signifi-
cance that arises due to exclusion/inclusion of the interrelationship with the market fac-
tor (see Table 1, specifications (2) and (2’)).  
Table 2, column (3), shows that sensitivity to overall market risk remains almost un-
changed compared to CAPM in Table 1. In column (4), company-specific sensitivities to 
other macroeconomic factors are restricted to be identical to some aggregate estimate. 
Estimated parameters are highly significant, indicating that restricting APT to CAPM 
would not be justified by the data. Directions of influence are in line with usual economic 
reasoning. First, (non-anticipated) inflation has a negative impact on stock market re-
turns. This might imply that investors expect a negative impact of increasing money de-
preciation on company profits. The negative parameter of changes of the term structure 
is in line with the rational expectations hypothesis of the term structure, as an increase 
in the term structure implies the expectation of increasing future interest rates, and 
therefore a heavier discounting of future profits. The parameter estimate of the ifo busi-
ness climate indicator has a positive sign, confirming its role as acknowledged leading 
economic indicator for German companies.  
Table 3 reveals that exchange rate exposure is not stable over time. To show changing 
parameter estimates, we divide our sample into four different, rather heterogeneous 
subperiods. The situation of the first period, 1977 to 1979, is characterized by a well 
performing German economy and appreciation of the Deutsche Mark. The DM/dollar-
exchange rate fell from 2.40 at the beginning of 1977 to 1.70 in December 1979. The 
next six years, 1980 to 1985, are predominated by the second oil price shock and the 
recession in 1981/82, and a sustainable depreciation of the Deutsche Mark against the 
dollar, reaching its peak in March 1985, when the DM/dollar rate was 3.36. After the so-
                                                                                                                                             
this correlation. Regression coefficients are positive for inflation and negative for interest rates. Signs are 
as expected. The positive partial correlation with inflation is in line with monetary expansions (contrac-
tions) that simultaneously increase (decrease) prices and foster depreciation (appreciation) of local cur-
rencies, whereas an increase (decrease) of the term structure anticipates rising interest rates, which in 
turn would lead to increasing capital imports (exports) and thus appreciation (depreciation) as a result of 
the interest rate parity of exchange rates. However, the only small overall impact from these variables can 
be seen from the very low adjusted R-squared of this regression which is only 0.041.   
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called Plaza Agreement reached in September 1985 by the G-5 countries (France, Ja-
pan, West Germany,  the UK and US), on a need to adjust current exchange, the time 
span 1986 to 1990 was characterised by a now strongly depreciating dollar. The 
DM/dollar rate fell to 1.50 at the end of 1990. The final period, 1991 to 1995, includes 
the time after German unification with a relatively stable but low DM/dollar rate (fluctuat-
ing around 1.60, maximum: 1.82, minimum: 1.37). 
 
Table 1: Estimation of exposure using (orthogonalized) augmented CAPM 
Model: 
oo o o
it i i t i mt it rd r α δβε = ++ +  
Explanatory variables 
(returns) / Parameters 
(1) (2)  (3)  (2’) 
  Test of common 
alpha
1) 
Test of common 
exposure
2)    
Test of common 
market risk
3) 
Use of  m r  in-
stead  of  m r  
Constant               
α  
    0.0081** 
  (0.0005) 





  0.0081** 
(0.0005) 




DM/dollar exchange rate  
δ  
number of compa-













   0.168** 
 (0.014) 
  - 0.002 
     (0.014) 




0.79 (RWE)  - 1.32 
(Daimler) 
company spe-
cific, range:  
0.79 (RWE)  - 
1.32 (Daimler) 
  1.071** 
 (0.010) 






cific, range:  
0.79 (RWE) - 
1.32 (Daimler) 
2 R  
0.529 0.529  0.519  0.529 
Notes: Sample: 28 DAX companies, 1977:01-1995:03, (6132 observations). See the text for estimation 
details. **) denotes significance at 1 percent level. Restrictions are tested using F-Tests: 1) test for unob-
served company effects, 2) (2) is tested against (1), 3) (3) is tested against (2). Corresponding F-
statistics: 
1) F= 0.79, 
2) F=1.10, 
3) F= 5.36. Critical values: F(27,∞, 5%) =1.46,  F(27, ∞, 1%) = 1.69. 
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Table 2: Estimation of exposure using APT multifactor model, 1977-1995 
Model:  α δβϕϕ ϕε = ++ + +++ 12 3
uu u
it t mt t t t
aa a a a a a
ii i i i i t rd r p i c   
Explanatory variables (re-
turns) /    Parameters 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Test of common alpha
1)  Test of common exposure
2)   Test of common market risk
3) Full  restriction
4) 
Constant                   
α  
    0.0083** 
 (0.0005) 
α α = ´´
aa
i not rejected 
 
  0.0083** 
(0.0005) 
   0.0083** 
 (0.0005) 
  0.0083** 
(0.0005) 
DM/dollar exchange rate      
δ  
number of companies with positive 
exposure: 26 
(significant: 8) 
 number of companies with (insig-
nificant) negative exposure: 2  
 
  0.139** 
 (0.014) 
 
δ δ = ´´
aa
i not rejected 
   0.136** 
  (0.014) 
0.135** 
 (0.014) 
(Residual) Market factor     
β  
company specific, range:  
0.79 (RWE)  -  1.34 (Daimler) 
company specific, range:  
0.79 (RWE)  -  1.34 (Daim-
ler) 
  1.072** 
  (0.010) 
β β = ´´
aa
i rejected 
  1.073** 
(0.010) 
Unexpected macro risks (in-
flation,  term structure, busi-
ness climate)    ϕ ϕϕ 123 ,, 
company specific  company specific company specific  ϕϕ =− =− 12 ˆˆ 2.06 * *, 1.78 * *
aa
ϕ = 3 ˆ 0.33 * *
a
 
2 R  
0.531 0.531  0.522  0.519 
Notes: 28 DAX companies, 1977:01-1995:03 (6132 observations). See the text for estimation details. **) denotes significance at 1 percent. Restrictions are tested 




3) F= 5.07, 




Table 3: Comparison of exposure models for different sample periods 
 
Estimates of residual exchange rate exposure, δ  
Model 1977-1995  1977-1979  1980-1985  1986-1990  1991-1995 
Augmented    
CAPM


















a δ )    0.139** 
(0.014) 





  0.296** 
 (0.016) 
  0.447** 
(0.021) 
    Notes: Estimation models: 
1) based on equation (4), restriction as Table 1, col. (2), 
2) based on equation (5), restriction 
    as Table 2, col. (2). *), **) denote significance at 5 and 1 percent, respectively.  
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Table 3 shows aggregate exposure
18 to DM/dollar movements estimated from statistically 
preferred specifications of previous tables, i.e. along column (2) of Tables 1 and 2. Looking 
at APT-based specifications, estimated exposure varied intensely from -0.308 in 
1980/1985 to 0.447 during the time period 1991 to1995. The estimate of the period 1980 
to 1985, i.e. the period of a very strong dollar and deep recession, was the only period with 
a negative exposure. The estimate (–0.308) indicates that a 10 percent increase of the 
DM/dollar exchange rate has led to a 3.1 percent fall of DAX stock returns. Thus, it seems 
as if further depreciation of the Deutsche Mark against the US dollar shied away investors 
during the space of 1980 and 1985, whereas other analogous times of a relatively strong 
dollar (or weak DM) had stimulating effects on the German economy.  
As macroeconomic factors are significantly different from zero in specification (5), we may 
conclude that for some periods estimates based on orthogonalized augmented CAPM may 
be affected by some omitted variable bias. The bias can be substantial, as can be seen 
from the time period 1986 - 1990, where the augmented CAPM estimate is 0.53, whereas 
multi-factor exposure is 0.30. However, it is not necessarily true that exposure estimates 
are reduced when other macro risks are included, as suspected in the previous section 
when discussing results of the overall sample period. Table 3 reveals that for all subpe-
riods with the exception of 1986 to 1990 (and except the total sample period), absolute 
values of exposure are higher when the APT-based specification is chosen, leading to the 
conclusion that avoidance of some omitted macro variable bias helps to uncover signifi-
cance of potential exchange rate exposure. This result is nicely visible for the period 1977 
to 1979, where orthogonalized augmented CAPM leads to insignificant exposure, whereas 
inclusion of macro variables has revealed a highly significant estimate. 
Figure 1 displays aggregate time-varying exposures from moving window regressions. The 
specification is based on equation (5), where company-specific exposures,
a
i δ , and com-
pany-specific macroeconomic effects,
a
i ϕ , are restricted to be identical to corresponding 
aggregate parameters
a δ and 
a ϕ , respectively (as presented in Table 2, column (4)). These 
estimates do not differ significantly from statistically superior results without such a restric-
                                            
18 Company-specific estimates are presented in Tables C,D (Appendix).  
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tion (compare columns (2) and (4) of Table 3).
19 Rolling samples cover a time span of 48 
months. Estimated exposures of each rolling regression period are displayed at the month 
of the midterm period. Thus, the first observation in Figure 1 presented for December 1978 
represents estimated exposure of the estimation period 1977:01 – 1980:12, the last obser-
vation dated March 1993 covers the period 1991:04 – 1995:03 (note that this last period 
almost coincides with the last period analysed in Table 3).  
 









78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92
 
Note: Estimates of exposure, 
a
t δ , are based on moving window regressions of APT-multifactor 
specifications,  see equation (5) and Tables 2, 3. See the text for estimation details. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates previous estimates from Table 3 in more detail. The graph nicely exhib-
its the time-varying nature of the German ‘dance with the dollar’ which implies, for in-
stance, that an appreciating dollar (relative to Deutsche Mark) temporarily entails decreas-
                                            
19 Attempts to estimate individual parameters for each company and for each rolling sample turned out to be 
unfeasible due to convergence problems of sample-specific ARIMA modelling and singularity problems.   
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ing company returns (as in 1980 to 1985), and at other times implied increasing values of 
German companies. A noticeable drop of exchange rate exposure not detectable in esti-
mations of longer time periods happened around 1990, i.e. the time of the fall of the Iron 
Curtain.  
Before we analyse the determinants for the time-varying exposure in more detail, we may 
conclude that the assumption of a stable currency exposure is not justified.
20 This result 
does not necessarily come as a surprise, as we already know the stylized fact that finan-
cial market parameters are not constant over time, as can be seen from the rich literature 
of time-variant market betas in classical CAPM-specifications.
21  
 
5.2. Determinants of Exposure 
Costs and benefits of a weakening dollar differ between firms. Exporters like car producers 
suffer from appreciation of domestic currency relative to the dollar, whereas companies 
which ground their production on a high share of inputs factorized in US dollars (like en-
ergy utilities) would realize unexpected windfall profits. Studies analysing determinants of 
exposure, in particular when they are based on data at the company level, focus on foreign 
sales but often ignore exchange-rate dependent costs from importing inputs. As we are 
interested in estimating and analysing the aggregate role of exposure in Germany, we use 
both export shares and import shares of (West) German GDP in order to analyse the dual 
and ambivalent role of exchange rate movements for the German economy. From the 
viewpoint of a representative firm operating in a world-wide economy, we expect that in 
situations dominated by the interests of foreign sales (German exporters), there will be a 
positive impact from depreciation of the domestic (German) currency on the firm value, 
                                            
20 This finding confirms previous results based on total exposure put forward independently of each other by 
Glaum et al. (2000) and Entorf (2000). The general time pattern of exposure presented there roughly coin-
cides with the one presented in Figure 1, but levels differ and curves appear to be more erratic when they 
are based on total exposure.  
21 Early evidence on beta-instability dates from the 1970s (see, for instance, Blume 1975). More recent evi-
dence using more sophisticated tests is reported in, e.g., Bos and Newbold (1984) and Gonzales-Rivera 
(1997). See Table D (Appendix) for company-specific variations in our sample.  
 
24
whereas the opposite would apply in situations which are characterized by a relative 
strong dependency on the costs coming from imports. Thus, we expect exposure to have a 
positive sign in situations of dominating exports, and to be negative during periods of rela-
tively high imports. As Germany for the most part had a surplus in its trade balance, it is 
well described by the situation of a net exporter, and we expect a positive sign for exports 
and a negative sign for imports in second-stage regressions devoted to the analysis of de-
terminants of exposure. 
Some preliminary considerations confirm these expectations. Table 4 provides descriptive 
evidence on the relationship between exports and imports, on the one hand, and exposure 
estimates of different sample periods, presented in Section 5.1 (see Table 3), on the other 
hand. Exposure is highly positive in times of sizable export surpluses, whereas it is much 
lower or even negative when import comes close to exports. In particular during the period 
1980 and 1985, increasing exchange rates were considered more a burden than a benefit 
as can be seen from the negative sign of exposure for this time period. Looking for more 
detailed explanations, it can be found that within a short subperiod (1980/81) the German 
trade balance was even negative.
22 Moreover, the beginning of the eighties were strongly 
influenced by the second oil shock such that any further increase of the US-dollar would 
be ‘bad news’ as it further increased the German oil bill. 
 
Table 4: Exchange rate exposure, exports and imports for different sample periods 
  1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 
Exposure 
a δ ( APT based, 
see Table 3) 
0.057 -0.308 0.296 0.447 
exq  0.274 0.324 0.336 0.373 
imq   0.253 0.303 0.276 0.304 
() () exq imq exq imq −−−
 
-0.030 -0.029 0.009  0.019 
       Note: Mean values of subperiods 
 
                                            
22 During 1980:3 (3
rd quarter) and 1981:2, the German export share in GDP was 0.298, whereas the import 
share was 0.302.  
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Besides these immediate influences from international trade, firm values are affected by 
costs of adjustment. The role of adjustment costs caused by the order of magnitude of ex-
change rate movements has received surprisingly little attention in the literature.
23 Theo-
retical analysis shows that profits and firm values may be a convex function of the ex-
change rate (see Franke 1991, Sercu and Vanhulle 1992, and DeGrauwe 1994, among 
others). Convexities can arise because of costly adjustments of international portfolios, or 
when volatile exchange rates affect uncertainty of future prices of exported or imported 
goods, among others. For instance, underestimating the risk of an exchange rate change 
might facilitate over-expansion of foreign indebtedness exposing firms to high costs when 
exchange rates do change. Moreover, marketing investments in foreign markets (German 
car producers in the US, for instance) and other entry costs might become sunk costs 
when a future appreciation of the domestic currency undermines the competitiveness of 
exporting corporations. Motivated by the fact that a high percentage of firms use hedging 
strategies to circumvent such costs of adjustment
24, several recent papers focus on hedg-
ing and reduced risk stemming from the use of forward contracts, options or other hedging 
                                            
23 Only a few articles test and estimate nonlinearities in exposure models. Whereas Miller and Reuer (1998) 
and Andren (2001) tested for exposure of quadratic and cubic macro-price changes with insignificant or weak 
results, Bartram (2004) performed several tests for nonlinearities with and without structure and confirmed 
the need to model nonlinear exposure by referring to significance of cubic terms. Results by Priestley and 
Odegaard (2002) point to the conclusion that exporters are subject to nonlinear exposure but importers are 
not. Our testing strategy differs from that of quoted articles in various aspects and is based on different data 
sets. Closest to our approach, Miller and Reuer (1998), Andren (2001) and Koutmos and Martin (2003) focus 
on (asymmetric) adjustment to depreciations and appreciations, but performed one-stage estimations based 
on (linear) dichotomous indicators of asymmetry make it necessary to analyse 9 possible outcomes for ex-
posure such that structural interpretations are difficult to derive. Koutmos and Martin (2003) also employed 
conditional heteroskedasticity of error terms of estimated sector stock market returns, but they do not con-
sider higher moments in their CAPM augmented market model.       
24 Bodnar and Gebhardt (1998) report that in comparative samples of US and German firms, 78% of German 
firms compared to 57% of US firms make use of derivatives in risk management. More recently, Bartram et 
al. (2003) present international evidence on financial derivatives usage for a sample of 7,292 non-financial 
firms. Across all 410 German firms in the sample, there were only 44.9 percent using derivatives in general, 
while 36.8 percent use currency derivatives. Corresponding international numbers for all firms of the sample 
from 48 countries, 59.8% and 43.6%, respectively, show that such practices seem to be less widespread in 




strategies, but they neglect to say that there might be substantial costs of hedging, and 
that the cost of hedging depends on the exchange rate itself (see Giddy and Dufey, 2003, 
for strategies of managing corporate foreign exchange risk and related costs). The price of 
an option, for instance, increases convexly with the expectation for a currency’s volatility 
because of inherent leverage effects: the more volatile, the higher the price.  
This paper takes account of exchange rate adjustment costs by modelling exposure in de-
pendence of exchange rate variation. In line with Franke (1991), who assumed the ex-
change rate to be mean reverting, and motivated by confirming empirical evidence found 
by Engel and Hamilton (1990), Frankel and Rose (1996), Sweeney (2001), inter alia, our 
model is based on the assumption that firms adjust their behaviour to expected long-run 
exchange rates. Resulting adjustment costs per foreign currency unit are assumed to in-
crease with the absolute distance  (,) SS ∆  of current exchange rates, S , from expected 
long-run exchange rates, S .  
A framework that allows derivation of exchange rate exposure and its determinants, has to 
be based on the value of a firm, V , which can be expressed as the present value of pre-
sent and future cash flows, i.e.  () / ( 1 )
t
t t VE C Fr =+ ∑ . Provided that cash flows depend on 
exchange rates,S , exposure is represented by the derivative(/) dV dS . With taxes, dis-
count and growth rates being constant, exposure can instead be measured by the deriva-
tive   




δ ≡=  
(see Bodnar et al, 2002).
25 Thus, exposure is equal to the change in profits,π , induced by 
a change in the exchange rate. Motivated by considerations stated above, the profit of a 
firm typically consists of domestic and foreign sales, reduced by costs of domestic and 
imported inputs, and by costs due to exchange rate adjustment. The firm is assumed to 
meet its exogenously given national and international demand by producing its output in 
the home country. Output is separated into sales going to exports,
* X , and output sold on 
the home market, X . Total output,
* XX + , is produced using inputs from its home market 
                                            
25 In standard theoretical terminology, exposure is defined as  / dV dS , but estimated exposure coefficients 
use rates of return data, i.e. estimated coefficients are more appropriately based on  (ln )/ (ln ) dVdS .  
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as well as imports from abroad. Accordingly, total input costs are assumed to be decom-
posable into domestic and foreign inputs. So a firm’s total output costs in home currency 
can be written
** () ( ) CS C XX ++ , where C  (
* C ) is the marginal cost of home country in-
puts (foreign inputs) of the firm in its home (foreign) currency (see Bodnar et al., 2002, for 
a similar separation of marginal costs).  Thus, a simple stylized model for the profit of the 
(domestic) firm in its home currency is thus given as 
(7)     ( )
** * * () ( )( , ) | | , PXS P X CS CXX S g S S H π =+ − + +− ∆  
where 
P         =  price of the firm’s product in the home market 
* P         =  price of the firm’s product in the foreign market 
          in units of the foreign currency 
X         =  the quantity of the firm’s product sold in the home  
     m a r k e t  
* X         =  the quantity of the firm’s product sold in the foreign  
     m a r k e t  
S         =  price of the foreign currency in units of the home  
currency (so if Germany was the home country, 
/$ SD M = )  
C       =  marginal cost of domestic inputs in its home 
   currency 
* C       =  marginal cost of foreign inputs in foreign 
   currency 
g       =  functional form of marginal adjustment costs  
** * * () HP X C XX =−+   =   net hedge position  
 
    
Disregarding adjustment cost (i.e. assuming  0 g = ), the model predicts  
(8)      






i.e. exchange rate exposure positively depends on foreign sales, and decreases when 
costs in foreign currency go up, for instance due to a higher input share of imported goods 
and services. Implied signs of sales going to exports and imported input costs are in line 
with previous empirical results in the literature (see Section 2). 
Turning to 0 g ≠ , adjustment costs depend on the amount of foreign currencies to be man-
aged. As currencies from foreign sales can be used to finance expenditures in foreign cur- 
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rency, the relevant hedging position is the difference between foreign output sales and 
foreign input costs,H . For reasons of convenience, H  is taken in absolute terms implying 
that any cost function g  weighs hedging of imports and hedging of exports in a symmetric 
way.  Now exchange rate exposure defined as the partial derivative of the profit function 
with respect to the exchange rate consists of three main components, namely exported 
sales, foreign input costs, and an adjustment cost factor, () f SH , with  () f S  defined as 
() (' () () ) f Sg S S g S ≡+ : 
(9)        
** * * () ( ) ( ) P X CX X fSH H fSH
S
π ∂
=−+ − = −
∂
. 
When, in accordance to standard approaches of modelling adjustment cost, a quadratic 
form is chosen, i.e. 
(10)       ()
2 () gS S S λ =− , 
with  0 λ ≥  representing an adequate adjustment parameter, then the adjustment cost 
component in equation (9) would boil down to the quadratic function 
(11)       () () f SH m SH λ = ,  
where 
22 () ( 3 4 ) mS S S S S ≡− + .  
Previous theoretical arguments lead to the econometric specification of second-stage re-
gressions. Exposures it δ , estimated from moving-window regressions in the first step, de-
pend on foreign sales and imported inputs as well as on a nonlinear component,  () f SH . 
As no individual data are available and since the primary intention is to estimate aggregate 
parameters, aggregate export shares in GDP, exs , and import shares, ims, are used as 
explanatory trade determinants of exchange rate exposure. Moreover, we assume quad-
ratic adjustment costs implying that the component  () mS H λ  (see equation (11)) has to 
be added to the econometric model. The component is linear in the parameterλ , which 
can thus be estimated in a linear regression model. In our econometric specification, S  is 
replaced by the mean value of the sample period (which was 2.083 DM/ $). Moreover, 
corporate-specific fixed effects control for unobserved heterogeneity (management strate- 
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gies such as individually different hedging practices, for instance).
26 We stack individual 
time series and base second stage regressions on the econometric specification (12), i.e.  
(12)       01 2 () it i i t i t i t t it exs ims m S H δ γγ γ λ ε = ++ + + . 
Equations for companies i = 1,…,28 are estimated as a system of seemingly unrelated 
regressions. Realisations of  it δ are obtained from moving-window first-stage panel regres-
sions under consideration of company-specific APT factors (see equation (5)). As expo-
sures
a
it δ  are estimated from moving windows, point estimates are allocated midway of 
each window, as displayed in Figure 1 (hence explanatory variables are matched to the 
same centre point of each window).  
Time series variation of exports and imports enables identification of trade parameters,  1 γ  
and  2 γ . Imposing the restrictions  11 i γγ =  and  22 i γγ =  for all companies i
27, column (1) of 
Table 5 confirms the hypothesis that an increasing importance of exports ceteris paribus 
leads to rising exposure, whereas a relative growth of imports diminishes it. Estimated pa-
rameters are surprisingly high at first glance: Looking at the estimate 6.84 for export share 
in column (1), an increase of the export share by one percentage point would lead to an 
increase of exposure by almost 0.07 on average. However, exports and imports almost 
always move in the same direction (both positively depend on fluctuations of world trade 
and the German integration in global business cycles; the correlation coefficient amounts 
to 0.54), such that the usual “ceteris paribus condition” has limited appeal in historical 
situations.
28  However, columns (2) to (4) show that signs of exports and imports do not 
arise as a spurious result of some multicollinearity between both variables: Including only 
exports leads to a positive sign, using imports as sole regressor reveals a negative impact, 
                                            
26 Company-specific effects are significant for all specifications presented in Table 5. 
27 Without this restriction, all 28 estimates of  1i γ  are positive, of which 24 are significant. As regards esti-
mated parameters on imports ( 2i γ ), 28 are negative, of which 26 are significant (5%-level). Testing 11 i γγ =  
and  22 i γγ =  leads to the result of an invalid restriction at the 1% level (F=4.11, critical value = 1.51). In 
spite of this result, Table 5 is limited to the presentation of restricted estimation results in order to focus on 
aggregate evidence concerning the overall German economy.  
28 Note also the high variation among companies ranging between – 0.90 and 1.26: see Table B, Appendix.  
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and also the positive sign of () exs ims −  confirms expected results.
29 The much higher R-
squared in the latter case compared to columns (2) and (3) shows that even univariate 
measurement of interacting exports and imports is superior to models with either of both 
variables. Table 5, column (5), informs about the effect of aggregate foreign involvement, 
calculated as the sum of exports and imports in German GDP. In line with previous results 
found in the literature, it can be concluded that the higher total foreign involvement is, the 
higher aggregate exposure of firms is. This specification, however, has only small explana-
tory power (note the very low R-squared). 
The next step is to test whether exposure is line with the hypothesis of (quadratic) adjust-
ment costs, caused by departing from expected long-run dollar values. Column (6) reveals 
that effects are as expected. The adjustment parameter (see equations (10), (11)) has the 
expected negative sign and is estimated as ˆ 1.61 λ = . The high importance of adjustment 
costs for profits and thus for exchange exposure can be seen from the adjusted R-squared 
that rises from 0.341 (column (1) when only exports and imports are included to 0.519 in 
the presence of the adjustment cost component.  
The estimation of company-specific adjustment parameters  i λ  (column (7)) reveals signifi-
cant heterogeneity at the firm level.
30 A relative high influence can be observed for corpo-
rations mainly belonging to the car industry as well as to the steel and metals sector, 
whereas the impact seems to be less important for energy utilities, banking and insurance 
companies.
31  Thus, though company-specific conclusions can only be tentative given data 
restrictions, exchange rate adjustment costs appear to be more important for export-
oriented firms, whereas import-oriented (in particular oil-dependent) firms and corporations 
mainly operating in the home country seem to be less sensitive to large deviations from 
                                            
29 An F-Test rejects the hypothesis  12 γ γ =−  at the 1% level (F=98.16, critical values at the 5% / 1% level = 
3.84 / 6.64). 
30 The F-statistic of the hypothesis  i λ λ =  is  6.88 F =  suggesting consideration of firm-specific adjustment 
processes (critical values at the 5% / 1% level = 1.51/ 1.77).  
31 All estimated parameters at the firm level have a negative sign. BMW, Daimler, Degussa, Deutsche Bab-
cock, Karstadt, Kaufhof, MAN, Metallgesellschaft, Preussag, and Thyssen all have parameter estimates 
below -2.00, whereas estimates for Allianz, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Hypo-Vereinsbank, Lufthansa, RWE, 
and VEBA are above -1 (detailed results not reported elsewhere).   
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the long-run mean of the exchange rate. This conclusion is confirmed in columns (8) and 
(9) reporting results for subsamples of DAX corporations. In column (8), the sample is re-
stricted to strongly export-oriented companies of the German car and truck industries and 
(former) producers of metal, steel and machinery (BMW, Daimler-Chrysler, Degussa, 
Deutsche Babcock, MAN, Mannesmann, Metallgesellschaft, Preussag, Thyssen and 
Volkswagen). The high importance of adjustment cost for this group of firms can be seen 
from the parameter –2.12, whereas the same parameter estimate is only –0.38 for a sub-
group of more import-oriented utilities (RWE, VEBA) and banking and insurance compa-
nies (Allianz, Bayerische Vereinsbank, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, 
Hypo-Vereinsbank) forming the sample in Table 5, column (9).  
Summing up, econometric results confirm theoretical predictions. In line with the individual 
behaviour of profit maximizing companies, overall exchange rate exposure increases with 
rising foreign trade and decreases (and might become more negative) with higher input 
costs. Thus, in an export-oriented economy like Germany where exports exceed imports 
exchange rate exposure is expected to be positive, as indeed was the case with the ex-
ception of a short period during the first half of the 1980ies (where exposure estimates turn 
out to be negative). Our results also confirm the hypothesis of significant adjustment costs. 
Estimates are in accordance with costly adjustment to long-run mean values of exchange 
rates, and are thus in line with the notion of mean-reverting exchange rates, at least seen 
from the viewpoint of decision-making financial investors.  
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Table 5: Determinants of German Dollar Exposure 
Model:  01 2 ()
a
it i i t i t i t t it exs ims m S H δ γγ γ λ ε = ++ + +  
 
Notes: All estimates include fixed-company effects and are based on seemingly unrelated regressions. Estimation period: 1979:1 – 1992:4; sample in cols. (1) to (5): 
28 DAX companies (1568 quarterly observations), 
1) subsample in col. (6): 10 export-oriented companies (560 observations), 
 2) subsample in col. (7): 8 non-export 
companies (448 observations).  (Asymptotic) standard errors are given in parentheses. *) and **) denote t-values above 1.96 and 2.58 (conventional 5% and 1% 
significance levels).
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This article analyses value changes of stock market companies in response to exchange 
rate movements, with special focus on exposure of the German stock market in the face of 
variations of the US dollar. Due to its high involvement in international trade, the German 
case is very well suited for testing the presence of currency exposure. The approach fol-
lowed in this work extends the standard way of measuring exchange rate exposure in sev-
eral ways, e.g. by using multi-factor modelling instead of augmented CAPM, application of 
moving window panel regressions, orthogonalization of overall market risk vis-à-vis cur-
rency risk. An important innovation lies in deriving and testing theoretical implications of 
exchange rate adjustment costs for firm values and exposure.  
As a first result, it is shown that the usual way of measuring exchange rate exposure by 
estimating so-called residual exposure coefficients in an augmented CAPM framework 
would often lead to insignificant results due to some collinearity between exchange rate 
risk and overall market risk. An application of alternative orthogonalization techniques re-
veals significant exposure for both individual DAX companies and the aggregate German 
stock market. Consideration of further macro risks confirms significance of exposure and 
shows robustness of results. Based on time series data for German DAX companies, 
DM/dollar rates and macroeconomic factors, we find a time-variant exposure of German 
stock market companies. Linking estimated exposure to German trade, we conclude that, 
in general (on average), German exposure is well described through the role of a net ex-
porter, who benefits from the depreciation of domestic currency. Accordingly, estimations 
of time-varying exposure based on dollar risks have a positive sign with exception of the 
first half of the 1980ies, when a relatively high import dependency and a strong US Dollar 
changed the situation.  
Our results confirm the hypothesis of significant adjustment costs. Estimates are in accor-
dance with long-run mean reversion. Deviations of exchange rates from their expected 
long-run values have a significant impact on overall German stock market exposure. We 
find that the larger the distance of exchange rates from their expected value is, the lower 
company values are. 
Future work should focus on the micro view of exchange rate exposure and its determi-
nants. Factor costs, adjustment processes and profits depend on individual markets and 
foreign trade activities. Valuable insights are expected from combining results from model- 
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ling imperfect competition and exchange rate pass-through, leading to the analysis of indi-
vidual profit margins (and hence exchange rate exposure) in terms of markup of prices 
over marginal costs, which would result in testing the role of further determinants such as 
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Table A: Descriptive Statistics: Stock values, returns and macroeconomic factors, monthly data, 1977:01 – 1995:03    
 
 
   DAX  com-
pany  returns 
( it r ) 
Average 
company  
returns ( t ri )
DM/US-$ DM/US-$,  re-
turns 
Interest rate 
term structure  
Inflation Business  Cli-
mate (ifo) 




Mean   0.006855   0.006855   2.034474  -0.002287   0.009337   0.030984   0.930831   402.4090   0.007517 
Median   0.007217   0.009790   1.874063  -0.003938   0.014100   0.029400   0.940000   396.8200   0.009532 
Maximum   0.319689   0.141223   3.356831   0.103722   0.036000   0.074600   1.079000   809.7240   0.137507 
Minimum -0.411905  -0.249551    1.393340  -0.090260  -0.037600  -0.010000   0.745000   132.3030  -0.245858 
Std. Dev.   0.070578   0.052028   0.435809   0.034898   0.017685   0.016935   0.075759   215.0022   0.048610 




Table B:  Descriptive Statistics of exposure, trade and DM /US-Dollar, 1979-1992, quarterly data. 













/ EX GDP  
 
/ IM GDP  
 
/ EX GDP  -
/ IM GDP  
 
  
/$ DM  
Mean 0.144  0.144  0.312  0.332  0.292  0.050 2.083 
Median 0.120  0.118  0.247 0.331 0.293  0.056  1.895 
Maximum 1.258 0.803 1.258  0.388  0.327  0.077  3.357 
Minimum -0.897 -0.514 0.000  0.271  0.251  -0.009  1.393 
Std. Dev.  0.375  0.313  0.252 0.029 0.019  0.021  0.468 





Table C: Exchange Rate Exposure of German DAX companies 
Company  1977-1995  1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 
 
ALLIANZ AG  0.032  -0.182  -0.379*  0.011  0.226 
BASF  AG  0.076  0.150 -0.242*  0.089 0.283* 
BAYER  AG  0.034  0.049 -0.254**  0.051 0.190 
BMW  AG  0.197*  -0.154 -0.153 0.318  0.452* 
BAYER. VEREINS-
BANK AG 
0.094  0.006 -0.328**  0.271 0.148 
COMMERZBANK AG  0.058  0.128  -0.589**  0.540**  -0.023 
CONTINENTAL  AG  0.135  -0.240 -0.310 0.442  0.260 
DAIMLER-BENZ AG  0.278**  0.032  -0.333**  0.559**  0.612** 
DEGUSSA AG  0.368**  0.215  -0.236  0.738**  0.632** 
DEUTSCHE BANK 
AG 
0.153* 0.065 -0.400**  0.580**  0.139 
DRESDNER BANK 
AG 
-0.046 0.224*  -0.681**  0.225 0.012 
DEUTSCHE BAB-
COCK AG 
0.190 0.029  -0.363  0.659**  0.361 




0.144 0.080  -0.338*  0.481**  0.063 
KARSTADT  AG  0.202  0.259 -0.351  0.347 0.577** 
KAUFHOF AG  0.232*  0.283  -0.340*  0.529*  0.402* 
LINDE  AG  0.158*  -0.132 -0.255 0.210  0.471** 
LUFTHANSA  AG  0.191  0.171 0.149 0.101 0.144 
MAN AG  0.123  -0.217  -0.459**  0.118  0.879** 
MANNESMANN  AG  0.144  0.057 -0.397**  0.276 0.517** 
METALLGESELL-
SCHAFT AG 
0.132  -0.009 -0.223 -0.049 0.601 
PREUSSAG  AG  0.427*  -0.064 -0.099 0.538  0.793** 
RWE  AG  0.031  0.040 -0.270*  0.085 0.190 
SCHERING  AG  0.163  0.389 -0.219  0.134 0.270 
SIEMENS AG  0.223*  0.212*  -0.264**  0.435**  0.329** 
THYSSEN  AG 0.198  0.376 -0.208  0.162 0.650** 
VEBA  AG  -0.009 0.036 -0.407**  0.197 0.028 
VOLKSWAGEN  AG  0.067  -0.242 -0.353 0.298  0.094 




Table D: Market Betas (overall market risk) 
Company  1977-1995 1977-1979 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1995 
ALLIANZ AG  1.316  1.150 1.439 1.280 1.301 
BASF AG  0.864  0.706 0.936 0.836 1.123 
BAYER AG  0.876  1.046 1.020 0.872 0.881 
BMW AG  1.193  1.544 1.048 1.316 1.253 
BAYER. VEREINS-
BANK AG 
1.044 1.078 0.868 1.104 1.002 
COMMERZBANK AG  1.111  1.070 1.529 0.972 0.929 
CONTINENTAL AG  0.922  1.313 1.196 0.780 0.800 
DAIMLER-BENZ AG  1.341  1.027 1.299 1.310 1.333 
DEGUSSA AG  0.945  0.912 0.969 0.860 1.222 
DEUTSCHE BANK 
AG 
1.159 0.945 1.363 1.060 1.028 
DRESDNER BANK 
AG 
1.166 0.786 1.470 1.139 0.907 
DEUTSCHE BAB-
COCK AG 
1.090 0.981 1.207 1.014 1.580 




1.097 0.911 1.015 1.119 1.033 
KARSTADT AG  0.858  1.035 0.660 0.984 0.875 
KAUFHOF AG  0.951  1.404 0.732 0.901 1.490 
LINDE AG  1.008  1.338 0.990 0.980 1.192 
LUFTHANSA AG  0.934  1.075 0.711 1.070 1.048 
MAN AG  1.129  1.366 1.175 1.098 1.204 
MANNESMANN AG  1.181  1.336 1.081 1.133 1.338 
METALLGESELL-
SCHAFT AG 
1.174 1.683 0.844 1.280 1.645 
PREUSSAG AG  1.108  1.388 0.958 1.140 1.116 
RWE AG  0.785  0.688 0.614 0.830 1.021 
SCHERING AG  0.967  1.203 1.137 0.953 0.833 
SIEMENS AG  1.177  1.007 1.217 1.194 1.066 
THYSSEN AG  1.028  1.174 1.134 1.005 1.263 
VEBA AG  0.810  0.757 0.744 0.811 0.932 
VOLKSWAGEN AG  1.277  1.869 1.332 1.307 1.351 
Note: Estimations according to specification (5), unrestricted version (see Table 2, column (1)). 
 